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1. Introduction and Summary1
he U.S. Congress passed the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) in 1977 to encourage depository institutions to 
meet the credit needs of lower income neighborhoods. The 
CRA was built on the simple proposition that deposit-taking 
banking organizations have a special obligation to serve the 
credit needs of the communities in which they maintain 
branches. At the time of the CRA’s passage, banks and thrifts 
originated the vast majority of home purchase loans. The 
CRA’s initial focus on areas where CRA-regulated institutions 
maintained branches made sense because restrictions on 
interstate banking and branching activities were limiting the 
geographic scope of mortgage lending operations.
Today, the CRA continues to provide significant incentives 
for CRA-regulated institutions to expand the provision of 
credit to lower income and/or to minority communities where 
those institutions maintain deposit-taking operations. Yet in 
the quarter century since the act’s passage, dramatic changes 
have transformed the financial services landscape, especially in 
home mortgage lending. These changes have combined to 
weaken the link between mortgage lending and the branch-
based deposit gathering on which the CRA was based. Today, 
less than 30 percent of all home purchase loans are subject to 
intensive review under the CRA. In some metropolitan areas, 
this share is less than 10 percent.
With a substantial portion of home purchase lending no 
longer subject to detailed scrutiny under the CRA, the issue of 
how best to modernize the CRA has emerged as an important 
public policy challenge. Some argue that the CRA’s costs 
exceed its benefits. Others advocate expanding regulatory 
oversight. Congress considered changes to the CRA in the 
debate leading up to the passage of the 1999 Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Modernization Act (GLBA), but in the end it 
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did little to make the CRA conform to the realities of the 
financial services marketplace. Although the CRA continues to 
provide significant benefits to lower income households and 
communities, reform is needed for the act to encourage 
financial services providers to meet the continuing needs of the 
communities they serve.
1.1 Summary of Key Findings
This paper draws on a more extensive Joint Center for Housing 
Studies assessment of the CRA, funded by the Ford 
Foundation. The larger study not only assesses the impact of 
the CRA on home purchase and home refinance lending, it also 
presents commentary on the CRA’s impact on small-business 
and multifamily lending, as well as on the provision of financial 
services more generally. In addition, the Ford Foundation 
study presents qualitative findings concerning the CRA’s 
impact on the operation of banks and mortgage lenders as well 
as the impact on the relationship between mortgage lenders 
and community-based advocacy organizations.
Our paper focuses on the regulatory and legislative 
challenges that confront the act at age twenty-five. In 
addition to providing a brief review of the evolution of CRA 
regulations, we document the impact that the CRA has had 
on home mortgage lending to lower income people and 
communities and assess changes in industry structure. We 
conclude with a discussion of current legislative and 
regulatory challenges.
The CRA Has Expanded Access to Mortgage Capital
Working in combination with the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) and the closely related Fair Housing and Fair 
Lending Legislation, the CRA continues to expand access to 
capital for CRA-eligible borrowers. Here, CRA-eligible 
borrowers include those with an income of less than
80 percent of the area median income and/or those living in 
census tracts with a median income of less than 80 percent of 
the area median. CRA-regulated lenders refer to federally 
regulated banks and thrifts as well as their mortgage company 
and finance company affiliates.
• In both 1993 and 2000, CRA-regulated lenders operating 
in their assessment areas (areas where they maintain 
deposit-taking operations) had shares of conventional, 
conforming prime home purchase loans to CRA-eligible 
borrowers that exceeded the equivalent shares for out-
of-area lenders or noncovered organizations.
• The CRA-eligible share of conventional prime lending to 
blacks is as much as 20 percentage points higher for 
CRA-regulated lenders operating in their assessment 
areas than for independent mortgage companies. For 
Hispanics, the equivalent gap is 16 percentage points.
The Changing Mortgage Industry Structure Reduces 
the CRA’s Impact
Dramatic changes in the structure of the financial services 
industry—and particularly in mortgage banking—have 
combined to weaken the link between mortgage lending and 
the branch-based deposit gathering on which the CRA was 
based. Consequently, this may also be reducing the CRA’s 
effect on the mortgage market.
• In 2000, the twenty-five largest lenders each made 
more than 25,000 home purchase loans and accounted 
for 52 percent of all home purchase loans made that 
year. In contrast, only fourteen organizations made 
more than 25,000 loans in 1993 and accounted for only 
23.5 percent of all home purchase lending.
• Banking organizations operating out of their assessment 
areas have expanded rapidly and today constitute the 
fastest growing segment of the residential mortgage 
market. As a result, between 1993 and 2000, the 
number of home purchase loans made by CRA-
regulated institutions in their assessment areas as a 
share of all home purchase loans fell from 36.1 percent 
to 29.5 percent.
• Assessment-area lending varies from one market area 
to the next. Of the 301 metropolitan areas examined in 
this study, the assessment-area share of lending varies 
from 6 percent in Denver, Colorado, to 74 percent in 
Dubuque, Iowa.
The CRA Fails to Keep Pace with the Changing 
Industry Structure
The changing industry structure, along with the fact that over 
time the CRA may have expanded the capacity of all industry 
players to serve lower income borrowers, has eroded CRA-
regulated entities’ lead in the conventional prime home 
purchase market. When Congress modernized financial 
services through the GLBA, it did little to bring the CRA into 
conformance with the rapidly evolving world of financial 
services. Reform could follow one or both of two distinct 
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• Reform could build on the CRA’s traditional mortgage 
lending focus by expanding assessment areas to cover a 
larger share of lending by banking organizations subject 
to CRA and by extending the act to include independent 
mortgage companies and other newly emerging 
nonbank lenders.
• Retail banking services and community-development 
lending arguably remain most closely linked to the 
branch banking mechanism through which CRA 
obligations are defined and implemented. Reform could 
therefore build on the CRA’s traditional branch banking 
focus and reposition the act to give greater emphasis to 
providing financial services to lower income people and 
to promoting the development of lower income 
communities.
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of these 
findings, we briefly review the methodology used to generate 
these results.
1.2 Methodology
The work presented here uses the Joint Center for Housing 
Studies Enhanced HMDA Database, which combines loan-
level data on borrower and loan characteristics with data on 
lender characteristics and branch locations from the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal 
Reserve’s lender file contains information that facilitates 
aggregation of individual HMDA reporters into commonly 
owned or commonly controlled institutions that can be analyzed 
as integrated units. The Board’s branch-location data are the 
source of assessment-area definitions used in the analyses 
presented here. For a reasonable approximation of true 
assessment areas, this report assumes that if a lending entity 
subject to the CRA has a branch office in a particular county, 
then that county is part of that entity’s assessment area. 
Loans made in counties where the lending entity does not 
have a branch are assumed to fall outside of that entity’s 
assessment area.
Other information on metropolitan area and neighborhood 
characteristics was linked to the HMDA loan-level data to 
assess the way economic, demographic, and housing market 
trends influence lending. These data included U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
data used to classify loans based on both the income of the 
applicant and the income of the census tract where the 
property is located. HUD was also the source for the annual 
listing of HMDA reporters specializing in subprime or 
manufactured-home lending.
In addition to quantitative analyses, this paper draws on 
qualitative information gathered during a series of discussion 
groups and in-depth interviews. In the spring of 2000, the Joint 
Center for Housing Studies held eleven discussion groups with 
more than 100 experts in four cities—three each in Atlanta, New 
York, and San Francisco, and two in Washington, D.C. (Belsky 
et al. 2000). The Joint Center also conducted in-depth interviews 
with more than 100 individuals in the Baltimore, Birmingham, 
Chicago, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, as well as in rural 
Colorado. These interviews examined the CRA in the context of 
the changing organization of the mortgage industry, the 
growth of new affordable lending tools, and the resulting 
changes in the provision of credit to lower income borrowers.
1.3 HMDA Data Quality
This paper utilizes HMDA data to illustrate trends in mortgage 
lending. HMDA data have been collected since 1977, but 
because they were not reported at the loan level by 
nondepository lenders until 1993, the discussion focuses on the 
1993-2000 period. Even over this period, however, HMDA data 
have a number of limitations. Perhaps most critical is the fact 
that the HMDA’s coverage of the mortgage market changed 
over the 1993-2000 period. One source of this differential 
coverage is the fact that although nondepository lenders were 
first required to report in 1993, some subset either did not, or 
did so haphazardly for several years. Consequently, HMDA 
data are likely to overstate somewhat actual lending growth for 
the 1993-2000 period.
Potentially more serious is the fact that the change in 
reporting requirements may differ by lender type, based on the 
specialization of each lender. Therefore, some of the growth in 
lending to lower income households relative to that to higher 
income households could simply reflect differential reporting if 
lenders specializing in lower income lending increased the 
reliability of their reporting over the period.
Counterbalancing these limitations is the fact that the 
HMDA database is a large and fairly rich microlevel data source 
at the individual loan application level. No other data source 
affords the opportunity to analyze lending patterns and trends 
by borrower income, race/ethnicity, and gender in such detail. 
Further, HMDA loans are geocoded to census tracts, allowing 
a thorough exploration of the CRA’s impact on lending in 
lower income, minority, or other historically underserved 
market areas. These strengths and limitations also suggest the 
importance of disaggregating the results by lender and 
borrower characteristics in an effort to control for reporting 
differentials across the various mortgage industry segments.172 The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
2. The Regulatory Environment
This section examines issues associated with the CRA and 
related legislation. We begin by discussing the early history and 
rationale of the act and then consider the evolution of the CRA 
and related legislation in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite 
numerous changes over its nearly twenty-five-year history, the 
CRA continues to focus on the presumed spatially determined 
link between retail deposit-gathering activities and a depository 
institution’s obligation to meet community credit needs.
2.1 Early History and Rationale
The CRA directed federally insured depository institutions to 
help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they 
operate.2  This focus on depository institutions reflected the 
fact that, at a time when intra- and interstate branching was 
largely proscribed, depositories were responsible for the 
majority of home mortgage and small-business lending in 
communities across the country.
The CRA directed bank regulators to evaluate the 
effectiveness of depository institutions in meeting the credit 
needs of their communities, including those of lower 
income borrowers and neighborhoods, consistent with safe 
and sound banking operations.3 It also required depository 
institutions to post in their offices a CRA notice, and to 
maintain and make available upon request a public file that 
included specified information about the institution’s CRA 
performance. Two of the act’s provisions that later proved 
most important required regulators to allow public 
comment on the institution’s community lending record 
and to consider an institution’s CRA performance in 
evaluating consolidation and expansion applications.
Despite these lofty pronouncements, the act provided little 
guidance as to how bank regulators should evaluate bank 
performance in this regard and how often these examinations 
should take place. Moreover, it granted the regulators little 
direct enforcement authority, other than stipulating that a 
bank’s CRA record can be used as a basis to deny the bank’s 
application to expand operations.
2.2 The 1980s and a Renewed Focus
on Fair Lending
After a decade, there was a growing sense among community 
advocates, and ultimately in the U.S. Congress, that the 
performance assessments and ratings specified in the initial 
legislation had done little to expand lending in underserved 
markets. In 1988, Senator William Proxmire, Senate 
Banking Committee Chair, held a highly visible hearing 
where he challenged the regulatory agencies to be more 
aggressive in their efforts to encourage banks to expand 
credit access to lower income borrowers. Despite the 
apparent rigor of the criteria, fully 97 percent of the 
institutions examined over the period received one of the 
two highest ratings (on a five-point scale). Indeed, 
testimony revealed that in some years in the 1980s, certain 
regulators conducted no CRA examinations at all (Matasar 
and Pavelka [1998], as reported by Zinman [2001]).
This is not to say that the CRA had no impact in the early 
years. Armed with a legislative mandate that a bank should 
serve the “the credit needs of its entire community, including 
low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods” and with 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data on lending patterns, 
community activists confronted banks and demanded that they 
expand lending (Bradford and Cincotta 1992). Not all banks 
responded, but some did engage with community groups and 
began to experiment with new loan underwriting criteria and 
with new mortgage products designed to expand access to 
credit in many underserved communities. Arrangements 
between community groups and lenders often were codified 
into formal commitments, or “CRA agreements,” where banks 
pledged to meet specific lending or service delivery targets 
(Fishbein 1992).
Despite this progress, there could be little doubt that more 
needed to be done to expand credit access to lower income 
communities. This awareness was heightened by the 
publication in 1988 of the Atlanta Journal-Constitution Pulitzer 
Prize–winning “Color of Money” (Dedman 1988) series 
documenting the disparities in mortgage lending between 
blacks and whites in Atlanta. This not only generated 
discussion of the failure of banks to serve “community needs,” 
but also linked CRA and fair lending in the public debate. The 
Fair Lending Act of 1968 prohibited discrimination in 
mortgage lending—a prohibition that was enhanced with the 
passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 and the 
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.4 Stimulated in part by 
the continuing community activism around racial disparities 
in lending, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments 
Act of 1988. This law, passed twenty-five years after the initial 
legislation, significantly expanded the scope of the initial 
legislation and strengthened its enforcement mechanism 
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2.3 Changes in the Late 1980s and the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act
The failure of the Community Reinvestment Act to have a 
more pronounced effect on lower income lending lay largely in 
its failure to provide regulators with tools to punish poor 
performance or reward successful behavior. The CRA’s 
strongest provision—the ability of regulators to condition or 
deny a merger—had little weight in an era of limited banking 
consolidation, and in any case was never implemented in the 
first decade following the act’s passage. Furthermore, both 
lenders and advocates perceived the examination process as 
capricious. Lender accountability was limited because lenders 
were evaluated on the strength of their plans to serve lower 
income areas rather than on the outcome of these plans on 
improving conditions in lower income markets. Additionally, 
any reputational risk and public scrutiny faced by lenders for 
poor performance was minor because examiners’ ratings were 
not made public. This was to change, as the combination of 
additional regulations and changing market conditions gave 
new bite to the CRA in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In 1989, Congress strengthened both the HMDA and the 
CRA in several key ways through the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). The act 
enhanced HMDA disclosure requirements to include the race, 
ethnicity, gender, and income of mortgage loan applicants, and 
the disposition of mortgage loan applications. These additional 
data—when combined with census data on the racial 
composition; median family income; and central-city, 
suburban, or rural location of the property—provided a greatly 
enhanced statistical basis for analyzing the geographic and 
demographic distribution of home mortgage loans. FIRREA 
also mandated public disclosure of each institution’s CRA 
rating and performance evaluation, established a four-tiered 
descriptive rating system5 to replace a numeric scale, and 
required banking regulators to prepare a detailed written 
evaluation of the institution’s CRA record.
Heightened congressional concern over the effectiveness of 
CRA oversight also coincided with bank regulators’ more 
aggressive use of authority. In 1989, the Federal Reserve denied 
on CRA grounds an application by the Continental Bank 
Corporation to acquire Grand Canyon Bank of Scottsdale. The 
Federal Reserve ruled that in light of inaccurate filings and a 
lack of significant efforts to ascertain the credit needs of its 
community or advertise its products—with no compensating 
activities—Continental Bank’s commitments to improve its 
CRA performance did not absolve it for a weak CRA record. In 
an equally significant move and on the same day that it 
announced its decision regarding the Continental Bank 
Corporation, the Federal Reserve released a policy statement 
outlining a more aggressive stance concerning the CRA, 
including a checklist of items that regulators should consider 
when deciding whether to approve an application to merge and 
a statement acknowledging the importance of public hearings 
and community input in the decision-making process.
The combination of the new policy statement and the fact 
that the Continental case marked the first time a merger was 
rejected on CRA grounds sent shock waves through the 
banking community. These events focused senior banking 
executives on the role of CRA compliance in an organization’s 
competitive position, particularly in the consolidation-
oriented environment surrounding the demise of many savings 
and loans at that time. It also awakened community advocates 
to the potential gains from focusing protests on consolidating 
institutions. The fact that CRA performance is a meaningful 
criterion in approvals of consolidation and expansion activity 
became even more important later in the decade as the pace of 
such activity accelerated after passage of the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Branching and Efficiency Act of 1994.
The growing congressional concern about lending 
discrimination also prompted the U.S. Department of Justice 
to expand its fair lending enforcement activity (Galster 1999). 
In a high-profile case, the Justice Department accused 
Decatur Federal Savings and Loan Association of Decatur, 
Georgia, of redefining its market area to exclude African-
Americans and of rarely advertising its products in African-
American communities. The Justice Department also sued 
the Shawmut Mortgage Company of Boston, Massachusetts, 
in 1993, alleging discriminatory treatment in loan approval. 
In 1994, the Justice Department accused Chevy Chase Federal 
Savings Bank of Washington, D.C., of violating fair-lending 
laws by failing to extend services to African-American 
neighborhoods. The Justice Department prevailed in each of 
these high-visibility actions. Settlements ranged from 
requiring banks to give aggrieved borrowers specific relief, to 
requiring the banks to expand lending to minority borrowers 
by enhancing outreach and marketing, altering underwriting 
procedures, and creating special loan packages for lower 
income applicants.
2.4 Further CRA Changes in the 1990s
The changes in the CRA continued into the 1990s as the 
banking industry and community advocates complained that 
CRA evaluations still relied too heavily on efforts to meet the 
needs of their communities, rather than on results. In 1995, 
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procedures to focus explicitly on covered depository 
institutions’ success in meeting their obligations under the 
CRA by examining actual performance in their assessment 
areas—the geographic areas where the institution has its main 
office, branches, and deposit-taking ATMs—and neighboring 
areas in which the institution originates or purchases 
substantial portions of its loans.
The 1995 regulations provided for specific tests for three 
different lender types, sizes, and businesses (large retail, small 
retail, and wholesale/limited-purpose institutions). The 1995 
regulations went furthest toward standardizing, quantifying, 
and objectifying performance criteria for large retail 
depositories.6 For these institutions, the CRA examination 
consists of three distinct tests: lending, investment, and service.
Lending is the most heavily weighted component in the 
overall rating equation and is most widely scrutinized by 
community advocates. Regardless of point values, no 
institution can receive a composite rating of “satisfactory” 
unless it receives a minimum rating of “low-satisfactory” on 
the lending test. Furthermore,  an institution rated 
“outstanding” on the lending test is assured an overall 
“satisfactory” rating, even if it receives substantial 
noncompliance on the other two components. In addition to 
formal CRA examinations, public access to detailed mortgage 
loan data under the HMDA allows community organizations 
to monitor the activities of lenders.
Despite the effort to focus on quantitative results, the CRA 
examination remains largely subjective, as examiners are 
directed to apply the relevant test in the context of the 
particular institution and the market in which it operates. This 
“performance context” is defined to include information about 
the economic and demographic characteristics of the 
institution’s assessment area; lending, investment, and service 
opportunities in that area; the institution’s product offerings 
and business strategy; its capacity and constraints; its past 
performance and the performance of similarly situated lenders; 
information and public commentary contained in the 
institution’s public CRA file; and any other information the 
regulator deems relevant. The new rules also attempted to 
reduce both paperwork and subjectivity. For all types of 
institutions, public comment is encouraged by requiring that 
each banking regulator publish a list of banks that are 
scheduled for CRA examinations in the upcoming quarter.
In a nod to the changing structure of the banking industry, 
the 1995 regulations also recognized that many banking 
organizations included both depository institutions and 
affiliated mortgage companies or subsidiaries. For example, the 
1995 changes gave each institution the discretion to include or 
exclude the activities of affiliated mortgage companies in the 
CRA examination for specific assessment areas. Recognizing 
that some mortgage company affiliates specialize in serving 
lower income markets, while others serve a broader market, 
this feature arguably weakened the CRA’s inducement to 
expand lower income lending by allowing institutions to select 
the combination of reporting that will produce the most 
favorable lending record.
Interestingly, the revised lending test, which gives lenders 
credit for certain mortgage loans regardless of the 
characteristics of the areas in which the loans are made, 
represented a movement away from the initial spatial focus of 
the CRA. Similarly, small-business lending is evaluated 
primarily on the size of the loan and the applicant’s business 
rather than on the income characteristics of the neighborhood. 
At the same time, the regulations continued to focus on 
assessment-area residential mortgage lending as well as the 
spatial distribution of the provision of banking services to 
assessment-area neighborhoods. As a result, more than two 
decades after enactment, the CRA still maintains a clear focus 
on the presumed spatially determined link between retail 
deposit-gathering activities and a depository institution’s 
obligation to meet community credit needs.
2.5 CRA and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999
The most recent changes to the Community Reinvestment 
Act occurred with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999. The GLBA mandates that 
depository institutions must have satisfactory CRA ratings 
before the institution, or its holding company, affiliates, or 
subsidiaries, can engage in any of the expanded financial 
activities permitted under the law. The GLBA’s “sunshine” 
provision requires public disclosure of agreements entered into 
by depository institutions and community organizations or 
other entities in fulfillment of CRA obligations. The GLBA also 
changed the frequency of small banks’ examinations to once 
every five years for institutions with an outstanding rating, 
every four years for those with a satisfactory rating, and as 
deemed necessary for institutions whose last rating was less 
than satisfactory. These small banks, however, also remain 
subject to CRA review at the time of any application for merger, 
to open or close a branch, or at the discretion of the regulators 
for reasonable cause at any time. Finally, the GLBA also raised 
important concerns about the privacy of borrowers and placed 
limits on the use of credit history reports for purposes other 
than credit scoring.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 175
Chart 1
Assessment-Area Lenders Lead in the Provision


















Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies Enhanced Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act Database.
Note: CRA is the Community Reinvestment Act.
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3. The Impact of the CRA
on Residential Mortgage Lending
This section summarizes an analysis of the effect of the CRA on 
regulated lenders by comparing their home purchase lending 
record with that of other lenders. Since CRA-regulated lenders 
and other lenders were influenced by the same changes in the 
marketplace, the comparison has the potential to highlight the 
independent effects of the CRA on lending patterns. The 
analysis suggests that CRA-regulated entities continue to lead 
the market in the provision of prime, conventional residential 
mortgage loans to lower income people and neighborhoods, 
particularly in terms of their greater outreach to minority 
borrowers.
3.1 CRA Expands Access to Mortgage Credit
Chart 1 shows the share of all conventional, conforming prime 
loans made to CRA-eligible borrowers. Lenders are divided 
into three groups: CRA-regulated banking organizations 
lending in their assessment areas, CRA-regulated banking 
organizations lending outside their assessment areas, and non-
CRA-regulated entities. Here, banking organizations include 
commercial banks and savings associations and their mortgage 
and finance company affiliates, while non-CRA-regulated 
organizations include independent mortgage companies and 
credit unions. Chart 1 excludes prime loans with government 
backing, including loans insured by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), as this lending is mostly a pass-through 
operation, with loans largely originated by mortgage brokers 
and sold into the secondary market. Finally, limiting this 
assessment to conforming loans avoids giving undue weight to 
those lenders operating chiefly in the jumbo market.
The chart confirms that CRA-regulated entities operating in 
their assessment areas make a higher share of these 
conventional, conforming prime loans to CRA-eligible 
borrowers than do either CRA lenders outside their assessment 
areas or non-CRA lenders. It also shows that the gap across 
lender types is closing, possibly in response to an enhanced 
understanding of how to lend to these markets profitably 
through experience acquired by CRA-regulated lenders in 
response to CRA obligations.
Table 1 extends this analysis to examine racial and ethnic 
variations in lending patterns. It highlights the fact that loans to 
blacks and Hispanics are much more likely to be CRA-eligible, 
presumably because these groups have lower average incomes 
than whites and are more likely to live in lower income census 
tracts.
At the same time, it is important to note that in 2000, the 
CRA-eligible share of conventional prime lending to blacks and 
Hispanics by CRA-regulated entities operating in their 
assessment areas was higher than the lending to blacks and 
Hispanics by regulated entities operating outside the 
assessment area as well as the lending by non-CRA lenders. For 
whites, the difference is minimal, but for blacks, assessment-
area lenders have CRA-eligible shares that are 17 percentage 
points (38 percent) higher than shares for lenders outside 
assessment areas and 20 percentage points (48 percent) higher 
than shares for non-CRA lenders. For Hispanics, the CRA-
eligible share for assessment-area lenders is 13 percentage 
points (28 percent) higher than that for outside-assessment- 
area lenders and 16 percentage points (39 percent) higher than 
that for non-CRA lenders.
Even twenty-five years after its enactment, the CRA 
continues to encourage CRA-regulated entities to extend 
conventional prime lending to historically underserved 
segments of the market. Other lenders, and indeed CRA-
regulated entities themselves, are increasingly using other loan 
products, including government-backed loans and subprime 
loans, to manage the increased risks inherent in serving these 
markets. But in addition to their growing use of alternative 
lending products, CRA-regulated entities continue to lead the 
market in extending prime conventional loans to lower income 
people and communities.176 The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
3.2 Multivariate Analyses Confirm
CRA’s Effect
Detailed econometric analyses discussed at length in the larger 
Ford Foundation study confirm that the CRA continues to 
have an important effect on mortgage lending. In particular, 
the act appears to have encouraged CRA-regulated lenders to 
originate a higher proportion of loans to lower income people 
and communities than they would have if the act did not exist. 
Moreover, CRA-regulated entities appear to have gained 
market share in the provision of loans to lower income people 
and communities, in effect crowding out lenders falling outside 
of the CRA’s regulatory reach. Finally, lower income 
neighborhoods targeted by the CRA have had more rapid price 
increases and higher property turnover rates than other 
neighborhoods, a finding that is consistent with the 
proposition that the CRA has expanded the provision of credit 
in these neighborhoods.
These econometric studies also suggest that CRA-regulated 
entities respond both to the regulatory requirements set forth 
by the act as well as to pressure from community-based 
organizations that the act has enabled. As a result, the 
econometric models suggest that even controlling for other 
mortgage lending supply and demand factors, CRA-regulated 
entities originate a higher share of their loans to lower income 
people and communities in their assessment areas—the areas 
under the most intense CRA scrutiny. Moreover, lower income 
lending is greater in areas covered by agreements made with 
community groups that commit CRA-regulated entities to 
expand their outreach.
Interestingly, both effects seem to be waning. Just as the 
growth of large banking organizations has fostered rapid 
growth of nonassessment-area lending, so too has the growth 
of these organizations changed the ability of community 
organizations to extract concessions from lenders operating in 
their neighborhoods. As in the case of the simple descriptive 
Table 1
CRA-Eligible Share Varies by Race, Loan, and Lender Type
Banking Organizations Non-CRA-Regulated Organizations
In Assessment Area Out of Assessment Area
1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000
All prime lending
Whites 29.6 30.9 28.3 30.4 26.7 31.2
Blacks 58.6 62.6 52.1 56.9 48.0 53.6
Hispanics 52.5 56.7 49.5 54.0 44.4 52.1
Other 29.1 27.2 27.8 27.6 24.6 28.1
All races 31.9 33.7 30.5 33.1 28.6 34.1
Conventional prime lending
Whites 27.4 28.9 22.0 25.5 19.3 25.6
Blacks 59.2 60.6 42.4 43.7 29.4 40.9
Hispanics 51.1 54.4 38.9 42.6 31.6 38.8
Other 27.4 25.9 22.9 23.4 19.4 23.0
All races 29.7 31.4 23.1 26.4 20.0 26.3
Government
Whites 43.3 50.1 41.5 48.8 41.1 45.4
Blacks 57.2 67.5 57.4 66.9 55.8 60.3
Hispanics 60.2 68.5 58.2 65.5 54.0 60.1
Other 40.7 45.0 39.0 44.8 36.7 40.7
All races 45.4 54.2 44.2 53.9 43.6 49.5
Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies Enhanced Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database.
Notes: “Other” includes Asian, Native American, and all other groups, and loans where the applicant and co-applicant were of different races.
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statistics presented earlier, the econometric analyses confirm 
that CRA-regulated lenders continue to outperform other 
lenders in the lower income lending arena, but the CRA 
effect appears to be on the decline. For example, the 
econometric models suggest that from 1993 to 2000, the act 
may have increased the share of loans to CRA-eligible borrowers 
by 2.1 percentage points (or from 30.3 to 32.4 percent). 
Estimates for individual years suggest, however, that the 
CRA impact has declined from 3.7 percentage points in 1993 
to 1.6 percentage points in 2000.
4. The Changing Mortgage Industry
Structure
The mortgage industry has witnessed a dramatic restructuring 
in the past decade. It has experienced an explosion of new 
forms of lending, the ascendancy of large lending 
organizations, the expanding share of loans originated through 
mortgage brokers and mortgage banking operations, the 
migration of some bank and thrift mortgage lending to 
separately incorporated affiliates, and the growth of secondary 
mortgage markets with its attendant reduction in the share of 
lending funded by bank deposits. This section summarizes 
these significant trends and assesses their implications for the 
evolution of mortgage markets.
4.1 The Growing Importance
of Securitization and the Rise
of Mortgage Banking
Historically, deposit-taking institutions (thrifts and 
commercial banks) dominated mortgage originations. As 
recently as 1980, nearly half of all one-to-four-family home 
mortgages were originated by thrift institutions. An additional 
22 percent were originated by commercial banks (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 1997). That 
same year, mortgage companies and other lenders accounted for 
the remaining 29 percent of all one-to-four-family mortgage 
loans. That distribution reflected the fact that deposits, and 
hence deposit-taking institutions (particularly thrifts), were the 
main source of funds for mortgage debt. Depository lenders held 
the loans they originated in portfolios because underwriting 
standards and mortgage documents varied considerably and 
third-party investors were reluctant to purchase mortgages that 
lacked adequate credit enhancements and standard features.
Over the subsequent two decades, this system changed 
dramatically. Although banks and thrifts continue to originate 
loans and hold some of them in portfolio, mortgage brokers 
and retail mortgage bankers now originate a majority of 
mortgage loans. In 1997 (the last year that HUD conducted its 
Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity), mortgage companies 
were the dominant (56 percent) originator of one-to-four-
family mortgages loans. Their rise came at the expense of 
thrifts, which captured only 18 percent of loans in 1997, while 
commercial banks were up slightly, to a 25 percent share of all 
originations. Further marking the change in industry structure, 
43 percent of originations by banks and thrifts flowed through 
their mortgage banking subsidiaries.
The rise to dominance of nondepository lenders has been 
facilitated by the rise of secondary-market institutions. The 
ability to package and sell loans in the secondary market 
reduces the need to hold deposits (or other sources of cash) to 
fund mortgage loans because investors in the mortgage-backed 
securities that the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
and private conduits issue replace deposits as the source of 
funds for these loans. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—by 
mandating the standardization of loan contracts and through 
their sheer scale—have played a role in streamlining and 
rationalizing the mortgage market role that extends beyond 
incorporating additional sources of funding within it.
In addition to Ginnie Mae, an organization created to 
securitize the government-insured portions of the market, 
private market entities are also now active in the securitization 
business. While the largest share of conventional conforming 
loans (those made at standard terms for amounts below the 
federally determined ceiling for GSE purchases) is typically sold 
to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, nonconforming mortgages 
(or “jumbos”) are also commonly pooled and sold as private-
label securities, mostly by Wall Street investment banks. 
Individual loans underlying both GSE and private-label issues 
that are made at high loan-to-value ratios carry private 
mortgage insurance, but issuers of jumbo packages tend to 
provide additional credit enhancements beyond those of the 
conventional conforming GSE issues.
Securitization has largely affected the market for prime 
mortgages—those made at the most favorable rates and terms 
to borrowers who present lenders and investors with small and 
manageable credit and collateral risks. Prior to the 1990s, 
subprime mortgages were chiefly extended by large finance 
companies, which financed them with secured and unsecured 
debt. Recently, however, securitization has also been 
aggressively extended into the subprime sector. Indeed, a 
joint report by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
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increased from $11 billion in 1994 to $83 billion in 1998, 
before easing back to $60 billion in 1999. Issuers of 
subprime mortgage-backed securities have tended to be 
private firms, because, until recently, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac purchased only prime loans.
4.2 The Rise of Large Banking Organizations
Paralleling the rise of mortgage brokers and the securitization of 
mortgage loans has been the rise of large banking organizations 
and their affiliated mortgage lending organizations. A study by 
the Federal Reserve noted that from 1975 to 1997, the number of 
banking institutions dropped 40 percent as a result of industry 
consolidation and a substantial number of bank failures (Avery 
et al. 1999). Following the shakeout in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the number of liquidations slowed, but the number of 
mergers and acquisitions continued to rise, stimulated by the 
globalization of financial services and efforts to increase 
efficiency, reduce costs, or gain competitive advantages.
Regulatory changes also supported the consolidation of the 
financial services industry as most state-level restrictions in the 
1980s on intrastate banking were removed or relaxed. At the 
federal level, interstate banking became a reality in the 1990s. 
This opened up opportunities for commercial banks to expand 
beyond boundaries that had been in place since the Depression 
and allowed larger organizations to enhance the scale and scope 
of their operations further through mergers and acquisitions. 
Federal Reserve System data indicate the scale of consolidation 
in the mid-1990s. From 1993 to 1997 alone, the number of 
banking institutions obtained in a merger or acquisition 
totaled 2,829, or 21 percent of the total. Over the same period, 
431 new institutions were formed.
To understand the ongoing concentration in mortgage 
lending, it is necessary to understand trends within the mortgage 
sector and in the broader financial services industry (Avery et al. 
1997). Among the various financial services provided by banks 
and related businesses, consumer and mortgage lending require 
extensive marketing, customer support, account management, 
and servicing operations. Large-scale operations are able to 
spread the high fixed costs associated with these tasks across a 
larger customer base. In addition to these classic “scale 
economies,” larger organizations benefit from “scope 
economies” that allow them to use data and information 
gathered from a large customer base to develop and cross-sell 
specialized, and potentially more profitable, consumer products 
to mortgage customers. Similarly, the organizations can reduce 
the average costs of mortgage originations by capturing the 
mortgage activity of their other customers.
Finally, technological advances also spurred major changes in 
the structure of the mortgage industry. The link today between 
the location of the borrower and the location of the lender is less 
important than it was even a decade ago because loan origination 
systems increasingly started to operate via telephone, fax, and 
now the Internet. As a result, many banks have abandoned 
conducting some or all of their residential mortgage lending 
operations out of  “sticks-and-bricks” branches, but instead have 
created or acquired large mortgage banking subsidiaries that 
utilize technology to operate from centralized locations that 
serve entire metropolitan areas or larger regions. Moreover, 
electronic loan processing and underwriting, including the 
growing use of automated credit scoring and automated 
appraisal and underwriting tools, have reduced the costs of loan 
origination and loan servicing and have allowed lenders to 
reduce costs by managing risk better.
For the most part, the new technology requires high fixed 
investment by firms, but once installed, it operates at extremely 
low marginal costs. As a result, increased technological 
sophistication in mortgage lending tends to favor larger 
lending organizations and has helped to foster consolidation in 
the mortgage business. At the same time, these trends have also 
supported the growth of mortgage brokers, who, working on a 
fee-for-service basis, handle the front end of the mortgage 
application process, a function that still may benefit from a 
presence in a local market area, and some face-to-face 
communication with loan applicants. Here, scale economies 
are decidedly less significant, and relatively small organizations 
continue to thrive as mortgage brokers.
In 2000, only twelve lending organizations made more 
than 50,000 home purchase loans, but these twelve accounted 
for 39 percent of all such loans made that year (Table 2). In 
1993, only four organizations topped 50,000 loans, and they 
accounted for only 11 percent of all home purchase lending. 
The number of lenders making between 25,000 and 50,000 loans 
per year also increased, though their share of the overall market 
was flat. Together, the top twenty-five home purchase lenders 
originated fully 52 percent of all home purchase loans in 2000.
Table 2 divides the lending organizations into two categories: 
banking organizations (that is, commercial banks and savings 
associations with their mortgage and finance company affiliates) 
and other organizations (independent mortgage and finance 
companies and credit unions). The table indicates that banking 
organizations led the growth of large organizations. By 2000, 
home purchase lending for the ten largest banking organizations 
totaled more than 1.1 million loans, and the top twenty 
combined for a total of 1.5 million loans.
The emergence of large bank lending operations reflects, in 
large measure, forces that prompted dramatic consolidation of 
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metropolitan market areas. Within-market consolidations 
reflect the increasing economies to scale of retail banking, and 
the trend for larger, more efficient banking operations to 
acquire smaller banks or otherwise increase their presence in a 
particular market. Growth of regional and even national 
banking operations also reflects the efforts of larger banks to 
capitalize on potential scale economies and name recognition 
as well as to reduce risk by diversifying across numerous 
spatially distinct market segments (Avery et al. 1999).
At the same time, several large independent mortgage and 
finance companies competed head to head against banking 
organizations in mortgage markets across the country. These 
included the two largest, Countrywide Home Loans and Cendant 
Mortgage, each of which made more than 50,000 home purchase 
loans in 2000. But many other independent mortgage banking 
operations either failed to grow over the period or merged with or 
were acquired by a large banking operation. This latter category 
includes such large operators as North American Mortgage, 
which was acquired by Dime Savings Bank, and Norwest 
Mortgage, which merged with Wells Fargo & Company.
At the other end of the spectrum, the data confirm that the 
number of banking organizations originating fewer than 100 
loans shrank by 10 percent between 1993 and 2000. This 
category of lender also made slightly fewer loans in 2000 
than in 1993. In contrast, the number of smaller indepen-
dent mortgage companies and credit unions was on the rise. 
For example, over the period, the number of independent 
mortgage companies and credit unions making fewer than 
100 home purchase loans rose 28 percent (from 1,163 to 
1,483) and the number of home loans made by these 
organizations rose 42 percent.
Consolidation among home refinance lenders was also 
strong, as the effect of technological advances and related 
developments that have reduced the costs of home purchase 
lending had an equally strong impact on the costs of providing 
home refinance loans. For example, lending institutions 
making more than 10,000 refinance loans in 2000 accounted 
for 57 percent of all home refinance loans, compared with only 
51 percent in 1993, with much of the growth again 
concentrated among large banking institutions.
It remains to be seen whether the dominance of larger 
organizations helps or hinders the provision of affordable 
home loans. Many housing advocates argue that smaller, 
community-based institutions have an enhanced capacity to 
better understand and address the credit needs of the 
communities they serve (Immergluck and Smith 2001). Others 
argue that the efficiencies associated with large-scale 
operations, as well as the ability of larger organizations to offer 
a wider and more diverse product mix and to access low-cost 
funds on the world capital market, are advantages that more 
than neutralize any disadvantages. In any case, there seems to 
be little doubt that the trends of consolidation in the mortgage 
Table 2
Large Banking Organizations Lead Mortgage Lending Growth
Banking Organizations Non-CRA-Regulated Organizations
Lenders Loans Lenders Loans
Number of Loans 1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000
More than 50,000 2 10 155,085 1,161,815 2 2 105,686 282,306
25,000 to 49,999 5 10 149,018 341,556 5 3 153,294 129,399
10,000 to 24,999 21 18 301,236 286,624 11 9 160,837 127,884
5,000 to 9,999 26 21 189,288 146,278 11 20 78,140 141,509
1,000 to 4,999 141 109 302,513 240,739 117 140 243,394 300,327
500 to 999 138 134 97,277 92,231 122 125 90,307 87,170
250 to 499 254 194 88,734 67,856 161 169 58,602 58,106
100 to 249 619 456 99,128 71,437 193 290 31,334 48,011
Fewer than 100 3,175 2,844 86,561 82,183 1,163 1,483 24,075 34,100
Total 4,381 3,796 1,468,840 2,490,719 1,785 2,241 945,669 1,208,812
Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies Enhanced Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database.
Notes: Banking organizations include all commercial banks, savings associations, and their mortgage and finance company affiliates. Non-CRA-regulated 
organizations include mortgage companies and credit unions. CRA is the Community Reinvestment Act.180 The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
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industry and the declining importance of deposits as a source 
of mortgage capital have yet to run their course.
Continued technological change should further enhance the 
competitive advantage of larger players. New automated 
systems require substantial initial investments, and smaller 
companies unable to afford such investments are finding it 
increasingly difficult to remain competitive in the mortgage 
market. At the same time, since these technologies operate at 
low marginal or incremental costs, they foster fierce 
competition among those firms operating in the market. Going 
forward, the result will likely be both a continued consolidation 
of mortgage lending activities and a growing reliance on 
mortgage brokers to take loan applications. In addition, the 
continued evolution of better products, services, and pricing 
can be expected, as large firms seek to identify and exploit 
competitive advantage in their pursuit of customers in an 
increasingly competitive marketplace.
5. Industry Structure and Current
Regulatory Issues
Changes in the structure of the financial services industry, 
particularly in mortgage banking, have combined to weaken 
the link between mortgage lending and the branch-based 
deposit-taking on which the Community Reinvestment Act 
was based. This section discusses these trends at the national 
level and their implication for the CRA’s impact on lending to 
lower income borrowers and communities, as well as their 
implication for the variation in the act’s regulatory reach across 
metropolitan areas and individual lenders.
5.1 The CRA and the Changing Industry 
Structure
The increasing share of loans by the mortgage banking 
subsidiaries or affiliates of bank holding companies and by 
independent mortgage companies has brought a concomitant 
decline in the share of mortgage loans originated by deposit-
taking institutions in the assessment areas where they maintain 
branch banking operations. An increasing share of all loans is not 
subject to detailed CRA review because the act mandates the 
most extensive review of assessment-area lending. Between 1993 
and 2000, the number of home purchase loans made by CRA-
regulated institutions in their assessment areas as a share of all 
home purchase loans fell from 36.1 to 29.5 percent (Chart 2).
 The fact that loans made by CRA-regulated institutions in 
their designated assessment areas as a percentage of all loans 
(or assessment-area share) has declined has several 
implications. First, a large and growing share of the mortgage 
lending industry (independent mortgage companies, finance 
companies, and credit unions) falls entirely outside the CRA’s 
regulatory reach. Next, even among CRA-regulated 
institutions, the fastest growth has been in out-of-area lending, 
or lending that takes place outside the markets where these 
organizations maintain deposit-gathering branches, and hence 
is not subject to the most stringent aspects of the CRA 
examination process.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that each of these broad types 
of lending (in-assessment-area lending by CRA-regulated 
banking organizations; out-of-assessment-area lending by 
CRA-regulated banking organizations; and lending by 
noncovered organizations) differs in terms of its product mix 
and market orientation. As a result, the extent of detailed CRA 
examination of loans varies significantly by loan type, borrower 
type, and location. For example, in 2000, CRA-regulated 
depository institutions and affiliates operating in their 
assessment areas made 38 percent of all prime conventional 
home purchase loans. In contrast, in the rapidly growing 
subprime segment, only 3 percent of all loans were made by 
CRA-regulated organizations within their assessment areas. In 
addition, the vast majority of HMDA-reported manufactured-
home lending was not subject to CRA assessment-area review.
Significant differences also appear in the home 
refinancing market, where assessment-area lending by CRA-
regulated institutions captured 32 percent of all lending in 
2000 and 42 percent of all conventional prime lending FRBNY Economic Policy Review / June 2003 181
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(indicating that depositories’ branch networks remain 
advantageous in this market). Even so, the vast majority
(96 percent) of all subprime refinance loans are made by 
independent mortgage companies and out-of-area lenders, and 
as a result fall largely outside the CRA’s regulatory reach.
The relative importance of assessment-area lending by 
depository institutions covered by the CRA also varies by 
borrower and neighborhood income. For example, the CRA’s 
regulatory reach is lowest for the nation’s historically 
disadvantaged minority groups. In 2000, assessment-area 
lending accounted for only 23 percent of all home purchase 
loans to black households and 26 percent to Hispanic 
households, as opposed to 32 percent for whites. For home 
refinancing, the assessment-area share for blacks stands at 
21 percent; the figure is higher for Hispanics (32 percent), 




Significant variation in assessment-area lending also exists 
across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The demand for 
mortgage credit will depend in part on the relationship 
between home prices and incomes in a given area. In areas 
where housing costs are high relative to income, there may be 
little opportunity to lend to lower income families. 
Accompanying this housing market variability is equally 
significant metropolitan-area variation in banking and 
mortgage industry organization. These differences are a result 
of the long-term economic performance of the area, the 
strength and national ambitions of locally based lenders, 
demand for mortgage credit, and state-level banking 
regulations, among other factors.
In some MSAs, only a handful of loans are originated by CRA-
regulated entities operating in their assessment areas, while in 
other MSAs, well over half are (Chart 3). From a CRA perspective, 
there are two important implications of metropolitan-area 
variation in housing and banking markets. First, CRA-eligible 
lending is significantly more challenging for lenders in some 
MSAs than in others. Second, vastly different shares of lending 
pass through the CRA-regulatory apparatus in more places than 
others. Consequently, the CRA’s effect from one MSA to another 
varies substantially based on MSA characteristics and the MSA-
specific structure of the mortgage industry there.
Table 3 extends this analysis and displays the ten metro areas 
with the lowest share and the ten metro areas with the highest 
share of assessment-area lending. At the extreme, the 
assessment-area share of lending varies from a low of 6 percent 
in Denver to a high of 74 percent in Dubuque. Although there is 
a slight tendency for smaller metropolitan areas to have 
somewhat higher assessment-area shares, at least one large MSA 
and a complement of medium and smaller ones are included in 
the list of MSAs with the highest and lowest shares. For example, 
San Francisco’s 60 percent share is some ten times higher than 
Denver’s share. Similarly, Brazoria, Texas, with one of the lowest 
shares, had a much smaller share of assessment-area lending 
than Lincoln, Nebraska, which is in the top ten, though the two 
MSAs had nearly identical numbers of home purchase 
originations in 2000.
This MSA variation also bears little relationship to the share 
of lending that is CRA-eligible. For instance, Denver, where 
only 6 percent of loans are made in assessment areas, has a 
relatively high CRA-eligible lending share of 40 percent. 
Conversely, San Francisco, where 60 percent of loans are made 
inside assessment areas, has the seventh-lowest CRA-eligible 
share, at just 21 percent.7 These two markets present almost 
completely opposite characteristics with respect to their shares 
of lending that are CRA-eligible and the shares that are actually 
originated by a CRA-regulated entity.
Table 3 does suggest, however, that the variation in 
assessment-area shares may relate to state-level banking 
regulations and the idiosyncratic characteristics of the individual 
markets. All six of Colorado’s MSAs are among the eleven MSAs 
with the lowest assessment-area shares in the country. Note that 
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industry, putting branch-based mortgage operators at a 
disadvantage relative to independent and affiliated mortgage 
companies. Moreover, a wrenching regional recession in the 
1980s led to the collapse of many Denver-based banking 
operations. Today, Denver and other metropolitan areas in 
Colorado are experiencing explosive growth, but this growth is 
largely being served by national mortgage companies—both 
bank affiliates and independent mortgage companies.
5.3 The Diversity of Mortgage Lenders
Against these general trends stand the rich and varied stories of 
the rise of individual organizations. The twenty-five largest 
home purchase lenders depicted in Table 4 illustrate this 
substantial diversity. These are the organizations that made 
52 percent (1.9 million loans) of all home purchase loans in 
2000. With respect to mortgage lending, there are strikingly few 
similarities these organizations share. Among large independent 
mortgage companies, Countrywide Home Loans operates 
nationally and focuses on lending to lower income, first-time 
home buyers. In contrast, Cendant Mortgage serves customers 
with slightly higher incomes through a unique marketing 
approach that yields a mixture of applicants, while Conseco 
Finance specializes in funding subprime and manufactured-
home loans for lower income borrowers. These different 
business models and plans translate into substantially different 
specializations. For instance, of the independent mortgage 
companies in Table 4, the share of refinancing loans ranges from 
6 to 36 percent of total loans.
The banking organizations in Table 4 are equally diverse. 
Overall, the banking organizations in the top twenty-five 
originate about a quarter of their loans inside their CRA 
assessment areas. For refinancings, the share is 33 percent. In 
contrast, Bank of America, which has a nationwide network of 
branches, originated more than 80 percent of its more than 
240,000 home purchase and refinancing loans in its CRA 
assessment areas. At the other end of the spectrum, J.P. Morgan 
Chase and Company, which originated nearly as many total 
loans, did so primarily through its mortgage banking 
subsidiary in counties where the company did not operate 
branches. Only 13 percent of Chase’s home purchase loans and 
10 percent of its refinancings took place in the bank’s CRA 
assessment areas.
The top banking organizations also have significantly 
different home purchase and refinance lending shares. 
Chase is again extreme, with refinancing loans accounting 
for 18 percent of its loans. In contrast, Citigroup (55 percent) 
and Bank One Corporation (78 percent) made well over half of 
their originations through refinance lending, even in 2000’s 
relatively high-interest-rate environment.
These comparisons illustrate just some of the distinct blends 
of mortgage banking and retail banking operations. Although 
physical location—sticks and bricks—within a particular 
community can boost a mortgage lending operation, it is not 
an essential feature. As a result, many mortgage companies that 
have emerged over the past several decades operate 
electronically through a network of brokers with limited 
physical presence in a given market area. IndyMac, a lender 
Table 3
Top and Bottom Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) for Assessment-Area Home Purchase
Lending Originations in 2000
MSA Assessment-Area Share Total Loans
Lowest shares
Denver, CO 5.9 63,755
Greeley, CO 7.1 5,735
Boulder, CO 7.9 9,306
El Paso, TX  8.2 7,244
Colorado Springs, CO 8.6 12,699
Tucson, AZ 9.0 17,244
Lawton, OK 9.8 1,208
Brazoria, TX 10.2 4,276
Anchorage, AK 10.5 5,022
Pueblo, CO 11.9 2,212
Highest shares
San Francisco, CA 59.6 22,228
Grand Forks, ND 60.1 639
Williamsport, PA 60.2 1,250
Pittsfield, MA  60.4 1,563
Wheeling, WV 60.5 1,379
Decatur, IL 64.7 1,748
Bloomington, IL 69.7 2,942
Lincoln, NE 70.6 4,278
Enid, OK 71.0 801
Dubuque, IA 73.9 1,063
Selected others 
Las Vegas, NV 14.4 37,035
Atlanta, GA 16.6 94,537
Baltimore, MD 20.3 44,343
Washington, D.C. 24.5 113,740
Birmingham, AL 25.8 14,861
Chicago, IL 30.4 146,434
San Diego, CA 32.6 54,357
Los Angeles, CA 36.7 114,254
New York, NY 45.7 59,118
San Jose, CA 54.8 27,565
Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies Enhanced Home Mortgage 
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that made more than 10,000 loans in 2000, is an interesting 
example of these trends. Once an independent mortgage 
company, IndyMac recently purchased a small thrift in the 
Los Angeles area and now operates with an organizational 
structure best described as an “inverted” mortgage company. 
Such a structure allows IndyMac to tap into traditional 
secondary-market sources, while also diversifying its funding by 
raising deposits in Los Angeles as well as in the national capital 
market through the Internet and other electronic channels.
Also contributing to the growing diversity of the industry 
are the mortgage banking subsidiaries of “nonbanks,” 
including mortgage companies that operate as subsidiaries of 
large insurance companies and financial services companies. 
Similarly, mortgage banking subsidiaries of major home builders 
and manufactured-home producers are included in the top tier 
of mortgage lenders in the growth regions of the country 
(Kaufman & Broad Mortgage, NVR Mortgage Finance, 
Oakwood Acceptance Corp, and the Pulte Mortgage Company).
Table 4










Refinance Loans Home  Purchase Home Refinance Home Purchase Home Refinance
Wells Fargo and Co. 219,623 74,118 19.1 52.0 27.8 30.4
J.P. Morgan Chase and Co. 184,102 39,788 12.9 10.1 33.4 39.5
Countrywide Home Loans 173,531 53,578 0.0 0.0 32.7 45.4
Bank of America Corp. 152,810 91,053 83.0 80.6 40.6 41.7
National City Corp. 147,146 42,920 11.7 17.9 40.7 39.9
Cendant Mortgage 108,775 6,989 0.0 0.0 30.6 32.6
Washington Mutual Bank, FA 91,843 43,680 63.6 64.6 24.6 24.5
Standard Federal Bank 89,670 41,051 32.8 32.4 32.8 38.0
Dime Savings Bank of New York, FSB 76,579 25,396 4.5 4.6 34.6 35.8
World Savings Bank, FSB 75,927 28,679 71.7 77.1 20.2 25.9
Citigroup Inc. 72,015 88,671 15.9 6.6 49.2 56.2
Suntrust Banks Inc. 52,100 13,398 57.0 48.7 29.7 34.9
GMAC Mortgage 49,650 28,097 0.0 0.0 32.3 33.5
First Union Corp. 45,862 48,118 64.6 46.6 42.5 46.2
Greenpoint Financial Corp. 42,217 18,055 1.0 2.2 46.1 25.2
Old Kent Financial Corp. 41,886 18,094 15.9 45.2 39.4 37.7
Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. 40,573 15,641 0.0 0.0 68.0 44.9
CTX Mortgage Co. 39,176 12,376 0.0 0.0 39.5 64.2
Flagstar Bank, FSB 34,036 21,512 18.9 16.3 35.7 43.8
FleetBoston Financial Corp. 33,798 21,941 33.9 51.6 39.0 33.2
PNC Financial Services Group 32,918 22,624 38.0 65.5 30.4 25.0
Ohio Savings Bank 29,633 11,005 14.5 8.5 27.7 30.0
Bank One Corp. 28,775 102,462 10.0 19.2 33.9 37.6
California Federal Bank 27,147 9,800 70.4 71.7 22.0 24.4
Irwin Financial Corp. 25,284 7,051 7.2 2.8 50.4 36.8
Total for top lenders  1,915,076 886,097 25.7 32.6 34.8 38.9
Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies Enhanced Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Database.
Notes: Top lenders are the twenty-five organizations that made at least 25,000 home purchase loans in 2000 based on activity in metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) included in this study. Lenders are aggregated at the holding company level. CRA-eligible loan shares include loans to borrowers earning less 
than 80 percent of the area median income and/or loans made on properties in census tracts to borrowers with incomes less than 80 percent of the MSA 
median as of 1990. CRA is the Community Reinvestment Act.184 The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary
6. Regulatory Challenges
In recent years, Congress, through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, has focused on financial services modernization, but 
little has been done to help the CRA conform to the rapidly 
evolving world of mortgage banking and financial services. 
During the debate on the GLBA, some sought to scale back 
the CRA, and called for, among other things, the creation of 
a “safe harbor” that would limit CRA challenges for banks 
with a satisfactory or better rating. Advocates pushed to 
expand the CRA by extending its reach to all segments of the 
financial services industry, including nonbanks that were 
involved in the provision of financial services. In the end, the 
GLBA left the CRA more or less where it had been, although 
discussion continues about the need to “modernize CRA” 
(Goldberg 2000).
6.1 CRA Assessment of Mortgage Loans
Is Uneven and Often Ineffective
The growth of large and diverse lending organizations poses 
regulatory challenges to the CRA. In their Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR), issued in 2001, federal 
regulators requested comments on how best to improve the 
efficacy of the current regulations. One central issue is how best 
to define “assessment area,” or otherwise determine which 
loans should be subject to detailed CRA review. At present, 
assessment areas are defined in terms of where a CRA-
regulated entity maintains deposit-taking operations. These 
rules reflect the original CRA philosophy that financial 
institutions had an obligation to meet the mortgage credit 
needs of those areas where they gather deposits. At the time the 
CRA was enacted, this focus made sense because locally based 
depository institutions dominated mortgage lending.
Today, the assessment-area concept results in an 
unevenness of application of CRA oversight. Detailed CRA 
review is conducted on virtually all loans made by some smaller 
depository institutions operating in a single area, but scant 
review is applied to the fastest growing segment of home 
purchase lending, namely, those loans made outside areas 
where organizations maintain deposit-taking operations. 
Furthermore, no review of loans is made by the independent 
mortgage companies not covered by the act from the 
beginning. As noted earlier, under current rules, CRA oversight 
has declined steadily over time and varies significantly from 
one market area to the next.
The diversity of mortgage lending operations and the 
decline in the share of all loans made by CRA-regulated lenders 
in CRA assessment areas have spawned numerous proposals to 
alter the CRA focus on traditional deposit-taking entities 
operating from a network of branch locations. Some argue that 
the current definition of assessment areas makes little sense in 
a world of electronic banking and national-scale mortgage 
lending operations (Thomas 1998). The ANPR generated 
numerous proposals for expanding assessment areas for CRA-
regulated institutions to include markets where regulated 
entities maintain deposit-gathering operations as well as all 
places where they conduct mortgage lending operations. For 
example, the National Association of Homebuilders (2001) 
advocates that assessment areas be defined as areas where CRA-
regulated entities deliver retail banking services, whether or not 
they have physical deposit-gathering branches or ATMs in that 
locale. In a similar fashion, the National Community 
Reinvestment Coalition (2001) proposes expanding 
assessment areas to include those metropolitan areas where a 
lending institution accounts for at least one-half of 1 percent of 
all home purchase and/or refinancing loans.
Other proposals call for the extension of the CRA to all 
financial services organizations, including nondepositories. One 
commonly suggested approach is to extend CRA obligations to 
independent mortgage companies and consumer finance 
companies that currently fall entirely out of the regulatory reach 
of CRA (Campen 2001). These comments suggest that despite 
the multiyear congressional debate on how best to “modernize” 
the financial services industry, Congress should continue to 
assess critical aspects of the CRA, including the act’s original 
focus on assessment areas linked to deposit-gathering activities.
6.2 One Size Doesn’t Fit All
Much of the CRA examination process continues as if the 
examination is being applied to activity in a single neighbor-
hood or community where a bank or thrift has branch activity. 
In this context, lending, investment, or service activity can 
reasonably be compared with the activity of others operating in 
the same area.
The growth of large and diverse lending organizations poses 
regulatory challenges to the CRA. Despite these differences in 
the scale of operations, current CRA regulations attempt to 
apply a relatively simple set of rules to a diverse set of 
depository institutions. Although the distinction between 
“small” and “large” banking organizations represents a nod 
toward developing separate rules for organizations of differing 
scale, the asset threshold (greater than $250 million) used to 
define “large banks” lumps together “small large banks,” that 
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with national-scale financial institutions making as many as 
200,000 home purchase loans in assessment areas scattered 
across the country.
Faced with the challenge of evaluating entities with many 
distinct assessment areas, regulators have adopted a number of 
sampling concepts that select just a subset of areas for “full 
scope review.” Since selection criteria appear to be weighted 
toward more densely populated assessment areas, these rules 
focus limited attention on smaller market areas, including rural 
areas. Moreover, for lenders with multiple assessment areas, 
current CRA practices “roll up” individual assessment-area 
scores into an overall average for operations in a given state. As 
a result, the current system permits an entity to obtain an 
overall satisfactory rating, even when the organization’s 
performance in a particular assessment area was rated as “needs 
to improve.”
Proposed modifications include the addition of criteria that 
would mandate “full scope reviews” in rural areas or 
assessment areas that are generally deemed to be 
“underserved.” The National Training and Information Center 
(2001) calls for “localized CRA ratings,” so that CRA-regulated 
institutions have an incentive to perform consistently well in all 
locations. Another approach would be to develop a multistage 
sampling procedure. This approach would first review HMDA 
and other readily available data to obtain an initial series of 
indicators of a given institution’s performance in each 
assessment area. Then, “full scope reviews” would be 
conducted in all areas where these initial indicators suggest that 
the lender’s performance may fall in the low range of 
satisfactory or below, while at the same time continuing to 
target for review a sample of other areas as well. Whatever 
method of selection is developed, other proposals call for 
specific penalties if a lender fails to obtain a rating of 
satisfactory or higher in any single assessment area that is 
reviewed.
6.3 Service Test
During the GLBA debate, numerous proposals surfaced about 
how to alter the CRA service test to account for the dramatic 
shifts in the provision of financial services (Goldberg 2000). By 
most accounts, the service test component of the examination 
is the least well developed of the three. Review of the CRA 
examinations for the banks interviewed for this study suggests 
that regulators in general spend little time on this element of 
the examination. In a typical CRA examination report, the 
service test gets a fraction of the space devoted to the lending 
test. The test focuses largely on the hours of operation and 
equality of access to branches in lower—as compared with 
higher—income areas where the bank operates branches. It 
also focuses on the pattern of branch openings and closings 
according to neighborhood income since the previous 
examination.
Lenders clearly perceive the community-development 
services portion as onerous to document, if not comply with. 
For example, lenders are responsible for undertaking the highly 
subjective task of documenting the charitable activities of their 
employees as evidence of their service to the community. 
Lenders also must take on the somewhat tedious task of 
describing the location of ATMs and documenting decisions 
concerning bank branch closings. Yet, beyond possibly 
constraining their ability to close branches in lower income 
markets, the service test appears to have little impact on the 
provision of financial services to lower income individuals.
Despite the apparent weakness of the service test, the 
examination’s component on retail banking services is 
arguably the most closely linked to the branch-banking 
mechanism through which CRA obligations are defined and 
operated. In contrast, mortgage lending is almost entirely 
decoupled from branch locations as underwriting decisions on 
the vast majority of loans are made by automated systems that 
can be located just about anywhere.
Meanwhile, many people in lower income areas frequently use 
check-cashing businesses, buy money orders at the post office, 
and get above-market-rate used-car loans from unscrupulous 
finance companies. Reacting to this situation, some have 
suggested that the CRA may provide an opportunity to encourage 
banks to meet the financial services needs of lower income people, 
who today are underserved with respect to many other financial 
services to a greater degree than they are with respect to 
mortgage lending (Stegman, Cochran, and Faris 2001).
6.4 Small-Business Lending
Prior to the 1995 changes to CRA regulations, limited data 
existed for tracking small-business lending. Although 
assessments of banks’ mortgage lending benefited from 
relatively detailed information reported under HMDA, the 
assessment of small-business lending was subject to a lower 
level of scrutiny. Since 1996, small-business data reporting and 
public dissemination requirements for CRA lenders have 
improved the ability to track and evaluate lending patterns for 
this component of the examination, although small-business 
data remain less detailed and comprehensive than HMDA 
filings. In addition, the small-business data collected and 
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on business characteristics, failing in particular to report on the 
race and gender of business owners. These factors combine to 
limit the effectiveness of the CRA’s oversight of small-business 
lending and limit its impact.
Among the weaknesses of current regulations is the fact 
that only institutions with assets greater than $250 million 
(those subject to the large bank examination) report small-
business data. A greater proportion of mortgage lenders file 
HMDA reports because the asset threshold stands at a much 
lower $31 million. In addition, the HMDA mandates 
reporting by most nondepository residential mortgage lenders, 
but only depository lenders file small-business data. Also, 
unlike the HMDA, lenders report only on originated small-
business loans, not ones that they reject. Furthermore, the 
“location” of a small business is ambiguous and could 
potentially be the owner’s residence, mailing address, or 
location of management offices or other firm facilities. This 
ambiguity may enable potential borrowers to “game the 
system” by using an address on their loan application that is 
located in a CRA-eligible area in an effort to improve the 
chances of their loan being approved.
6.5 Regulatory Toughness
Focus on the effectiveness of the implementation of the small-
business lending or the service-test portions of the CRA is part 
of a larger set of issues relating to the uniformity of CRA 
enforcement by the four regulatory agencies. The regulatory 
agencies do coordinate their activities through the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, but in practice there 
is wide variation in how the CRA is enforced. In 1995, a U.S. 
General Accounting Office study (1995) reviewed forty CRA 
evaluations and found general evidence of inconsistent grading 
from one examiner to another. Similarly, Thomas (1998) 
reviewed 1,407 CRA examinations and found significant 
variation both between and within regulatory agencies. Using 
data from the Thomas study, Zinman (2001) found not only that 
there was clear evidence of differing degrees of “regulator 
toughness” from one regulator to the next, but also from one 
geographical region to the next. Moreover, Zinman concluded 
that this variation in the degree of toughness mattered, in that 
banks with tougher regulators were more likely to expand the 
provision of small-business loans.
Findings such as these continue to fuel the ongoing debate 
as to how best to implement CRA provisions in the evolving 
world of financial services. Absent further regulatory reform, 
many bankers will continue to push for legislative relief, 
arguing that the CRA is “unfairly” administered. At the same 
time, housing advocates will counter by noting that when 
“properly implemented,” the CRA does produce clear benefits 
and that there is significant room to extend the reach of the 
CRA beyond the world of residential mortgage lending. In 
short, the debate over how to implement the CRA effectively is 
likely to continue into the foreseeable future.
6.6 HMDA Data Collection
Closely related to the ongoing discussion of CRA enforcement 
is the discussion of HMDA data collection. The structure of the 
large-bank CRA examination formally makes the lending test 
as important as the investment and service tests combined. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that of the three lending test 
components, mortgage lending carries the most weight. To the 
extent that this is true, it is a reflection of the fact that analysis 
of mortgage lending is supported by HMDA data, which, while 
imperfect, are more widely accessible, comprehensive, and 
available over a longer duration than data for small-business or 
community-development lending. It also reflects the large 
share of all lending in lower income market sectors that is 
devoted to housing.
HMDA data have also been the primary empirical tool used 
to complement street-level activism by community advocates. 
These groups have used the HMDA to evaluate and in some 
instances lodge protests with regulators about the performance 
of lenders in their communities. However, despite its important 
role in the struggles of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, 
HMDA’s usefulness waned as reporting requirements failed to 
keep pace with the rapid restructuring of the mortgage lending 
industry. Among the key changes are the growth of subprime 
lending, the increased prominence of manufactured housing as 
a tenure choice for lower income people, and the growth of loans 
by consumer lending organizations.
The area where current HMDA data perhaps lagged the 
market most was in the HDMA’s failure to collect data that 
would allow loans to be distinguished as being for 
manufactured housing or made at terms below the “A” rate. 
Current practice by many analysts supplements public HMDA 
data with a lender “specialization” list available from HUD that 
makes it possible to classify loans as being made by an 
institution that focuses on prime, subprime, or manufactured-
housing lending. Given the diversity of products offered by 
large and even relatively small lenders, this constitutes a coarse 
method of sorting loans. Many subprime lending specialists 
also make prime loans, just as banks and mortgage lenders may 
make subprime or manufactured-home loans, although the 
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Analysis of lending patterns for manufactured housing is 
hampered by a lack of information on property characteristics, 
making it impossible to determine whether a loan by a 
manufactured-housing specialist involved the acquisition of a 
unit placed on rented land or the purchase of a manufactured 
home and associated land. Because the potential financial 
outcome of the transaction for the typical owner of 
manufactured housing rests in large part on whether or not he 
or she owns the land, knowing the property characteristics 
would allow regulators to assess differentially banks’ lending of 
each type during the examination. Although this information is 
known to the lender at the time the loan is made, many bankers 
argue that including this information in the HMDA would be 
prohibitively costly.
Subprime lending raises even thornier issues for regulators 
attempting to assess an institution’s lower income mortgage 
lending performance. Currently, regulators can obtain 
information about the terms and pricing of mortgage contracts 
that goes beyond what appears in HMDA reports. But review of 
CRA evaluations suggests that most CRA examinations do not 
take advantage of this potential. As a result, most examinations 
merge all loans to lower income people and communities to 
produce an aggregate lending total. This results, for example, in 
equal credit being awarded in examinations for loans to lower 
income people and areas made at the “A” rate and the “B” or 
“C” rate, or for loans that do and do not reflect practices, such 
as inclusion of single-premium credit insurance, that are 
widely considered predatory. Meanwhile, the rise of new 
players in the home mortgage market, including independent 
consumer finance companies engaged in mortgage lending, has 
served to limit the share of all home lending covered by HMDA 
reporting.
Given the importance of understanding more fully the 
implications of the rapid expansion of mortgage product 
offerings—particularly as they relate to lower income 
households and communities—in January 2002, the Federal 
Reserve issued a rule to expand the number of nondepository 
institutions subject to HMDA reporting requirements. The 
rule also called for disclosing pricing data on higher cost loans 
and identifying loans on manufactured homes. In particular, 
the new rule extends HMDA coverage to nondepository 
institutions making more than $25 million in mortgage loans. 
Currently, nondepository lenders report under the HMDA 
only if their residential mortgage lending (including home 
purchase and refinance loans) during the previous year equaled 
or exceeded 10 percent of their total loan originations. In 
addition, the new rule requires lenders to identify whether the 
loan is “high-cost,” as defined by the Home Ownership and 
Equity Protection Act, and to report the spread between the 
annual percentage rate and the yield on the comparable 
Treasury security when this spread exceeds 3 percent for first-
lien loans and exceeds 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien 
loans. Finally, the new regulation requires lenders to report 
whether the loan involves a manufactured home.
7.C o n c l u s i o n
On this twenty-fifth anniversary of the Community 
Reinvestment Act’s enactment, reform is needed to ensure that 
the act keeps pace with dramatic shifts in mortgage lending and 
the financial services industry. Reform could come either as a 
result of new rulemaking by federal regulators or new 
legislation. In either case, there appear to be two major 
pathways to reform: 1) reform could maintain and improve 
upon the CRA’s historical focus on residential mortgage 
lending, or 2) reform could reposition the CRA to give more 
emphasis to community-development activities and the 
provision of banking services to lower income people and 
communities more generally.
Residential mortgage lending has been central to the CRA 
since its passage, yet the act’s historical focus on assessment 
areas linked to deposit-taking activities makes little sense 
today. Limiting detailed CRA scrutiny to assessment-area loans 
arguably distorts the efficient operation of the marketplace. 
Minimally, it seems unfair for the CRA to mandate detailed 
scrutiny of a relatively large share of home loans made in some 
metropolitan areas and by some lenders, while at the same time 
devoting so little attention to the vast majority of loans made in 
other areas and by other lenders. In order to extend the CRA’s 
legacy of expanding home-buying opportunities to lower 
income people and communities, federal regulators should 
consider expanding assessment-area definitions to include 
loans made by the CRA-regulated entities operating outside the 
areas where they maintain deposit-taking branches. In 
addition, Congress should also consider expanding the CRA to 
include the residential mortgage lending operations of a diverse 
set of nondepository organizations now playing an increasingly 
important role in lending to lower income people and 
communities.
Alternatively, if Congress and/or the federal regulators 
choose to focus the most extensive CRA-imposed obligations 
only on the CRA-regulated entities operating in assessment 
areas defined by the location of deposit-taking branches, then 
the CRA needs to be “repositioned” to better reflect what these 
organizations actually do. Given the growth of large banking 
organizations, many smaller banks and thrifts have abandoned 
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on other forms of lending, including small-business and 
community-development lending. In this regard, retail 
banking services are arguably most closely linked to the 
branch-banking mechanism through which CRA obligations 
are defined and operated. Going forward, new CRA regulations 
could expand the CRA’s focus on small-business and 
community-development lending and investment as well as the 
provision of banking services.
In any event, the Community Reinvestment Act must 
change. It is hoped that Congress, having finished work on the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, will continue to work with housing 
advocates, industry representatives, and regulators to craft a 
consensus on “CRA modernization” and how best to address 
the ongoing needs of lower income communities for improved 
access to credit and financial services.Endnotes
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1. This paper draws on research funded by the Ford Foundation and 
contained in the Joint Center for Housing Studies report, “The 
Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Community Reinvestment Act: 
Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Services System.” See also 
previous work completed by the Joint Center and the Brookings 
Institution for the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Litan et al. 2000, 
2001). An earlier version of this paper, “The Evolution of CRA: 
Changing Industry Structure and CRA Regulations,” was presented at 
the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Annual 
Meeting in January 2002. 
2. Insured depository institutions include any bank or savings 
association, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). CRA does not apply to credit unions 
and independent mortgage companies.
3. The federal banking regulators responsible for administering the 
statute are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for national 
banks; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for state-
chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and 
for  bank holding companies; the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation for state-chartered banks and savings banks that are not 
members of the Federal Reserve System and whose deposits are 
insured by the FDIC; and the Office of Thrift Supervision for savings 
associations whose deposits are insured by the FDIC and for savings 
association holding companies. 
4. For an excellent collection of essays on the cause and extent of 
mortgage lending discrimination, see Goering and Wienk (1996). 
5. The four-tiered rating system was: outstanding, satisfactory, needs 
to improve, substantial noncompliance.
6. Institutions are defined as those with $250 million or more in assets 
or those belonging to a holding company with $1 billion or more in 
assets.
7. The shares for Oakland and San Jose are 25 percent and 28 percent, 
respectively.References
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